In this paper we show that if all agents are equipped with well-behaved discrete concave production functions, then a feasible price allocation pair is a market equilibrium if and only if it solves a linear programming problem. Using this result we are able to obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for existence that requires an equilibrium price vector to satisfy finitely many inequalities. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market equilibrium when the maximum value function is Weakly Monotonic at the initial endowment that follows from our results is that the maximum value function is partially concave at the initial endowment. We also provide a discussion of the results and an alternative solution concept. The alternative solution concept is however, informationally and computationally inefficient.
1. Introduction: The equilibrium existence problem with indivisibilities has been investigated by Yang (2001) and more recently by Sun and Yang (2004) . The model they consider is the model of a market game due to Shubik (1969, 1976) , with the goods being available for redistribution among the agents being available in integer units only. Yang (2004) , shows that a constrained market equilibrium (i.e. a market clearing allocation, where each agent is constrained to maximize profit subject to its consumption not exceeding the initial endowment of the goods), exists if and only if there is a feasible price allocation pair that solves a certain linear programming problem. The result is obtained without any concavity assumption being imposed on the production function of the agents. In this paper we show that if all agents are equipped with discrete concave production function, then a feasible price allocation pair is a market equilibrium (i.e. where agents solve an unconstrained profit maximization problem at given prices to obtain the resulting market clearing allocation) if and only if it solves a linear programming problem, similar to, but perhaps simpler than the one invoked in Yang (2001) . Using this result, but assuming discrete concave production function for the agents once again, we are able to show that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of market equilibrium available in Sun and Yang (2004) , which involved obtaining a price vector that satisfied infinitely many inequalities, can be reduced to one where such a price vector satisfies finitely many such inequalities.
These results provide the necessary computational device for obtaining a market equilibrium for integer allocation problems. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (1998) , obtain existence results for what they call the package assignment model. Package assignment models turn out to have a structure similar to the one studied in Yang (2001) . In a final section we provide a discussion of the results and an alternative solution concept. However, the construction of this new solution for an integer allocation problem generally requires an infinite number of computations and hence an unrealistic data set. Thus, its practical usefulness as a solution for integer allocation problems is doubtful.
2. The Model: We now develop the general equilibrium model for the case where the inputs are available in integer amount only. Let Z = ‫,}0{∪א‬ where ‫א‬ denotes the set of natural numbers. Let there be H > 0 agents and L+1 > 1 commodities. The first L commodities are used as inputs to produce the L+1 th commodity, which is a numeraire consumption good. Let w∈Z L denote the aggregate initial endowment of the inputs which is available for distribution among the agents. For j = 1,…,L, let w j denote the aggregate amount of commodity j that is initially available in the economy. A function f: Z L →ℜ + (: the set of non-negative real numbers) is said to be discrete concave if there exists a continuous concave function g: →ℜ L + ℜ + such that the restriction of g to Z L coincides with f. While discrete concavity could be defined for functions whose range may include negative real numbers or for that matter are unbounded below, for the purpose of the analysis reported here such a generalization would be superfluous, since we shall primarily be concerned with the discrete concavity of production functions. Given functions f: Z L →ℜ + and g: →ℜ 
Each agent i has preferences defined over Z L which is represented by a discrete concave production function f i .
The pair <{f i /i= 1,…,H}, w> where for all i∈{1,…,H}, f i is well behaved up to w +e, is called an integer allocation problem and is assumed to be a given for the rest of the analysis. The following result is available in Lahiri (2005) and will be used in the sequel.
Proposition 1: Let <p*,X*> be a market equilibrium. Then X* is an efficient allocation.
A constrained market equilibrium is a pair <p*,X*> where p* is a price vector, X* is a feasible allocation such that for all i = 1,…,H, X* i solves:
Clearly a market equilibrium is a constrained market equilibrium. The following example shows that a constrained market equilibrium need not be a market equilibrium. Example 1: Let H = 1, L = 1, f 1 (x) = x for all x∈Z and w = 1. Let X* 1 = 1 and X* = <X* 1 >. For all p∈(0, 1], <p, X*> is a constrained market equilibrium, though for p∈(0,1), <p, X*> is never a market equilibrium. <1,X*> is the unique market equilibrium for this integer allocation problem.
However, if <{f i /i= 1,…,H}, w> is a multi-unit auction then <p*, X*> is a market equilibrium if and only if it is a constrained market equilibrium. For x, y∈Z L let m(x,y) be the L-vector whose j th coordinate is min{x j ,y j }. Thus, if <{f i /i= 1,…,H}, w> is a multi-unit auction then for all i = 1,…,H and
Proposition 2: Let <{f i /i= 1,…,H}, w> be a multi-unit auction. Then <p*, X*> is a market equilibrium if and only if it is a constrained market equilibrium.
Proof: We only need to show that if <p*,X*> is a constrained market equilibrium for the multi unit auction <{f i /i= 1,…,H}, w>, then it is also a market equilibrium. Hence suppose <p*,X*> is a constrained market equilibrium. Let x∈Z L . If x ≤ w, then x = m(x,w) and clearly for all i = 1,…,H:
3. Existence of Market Equilibrium: This section is devoted to obtaining results pertaining to the existence of market equilibrium for the given integer allocation problem. We now state and prove the main theorem of this paper. 
Summing over i we get:
Thus, <p*,m*> satisfies the constraints. Hence, <p*,m*> solves the minimization problem. Now, suppose <p*,m*> solves the given minimization problem. Towards a contradiction suppose <p*, X*> is not a market equilibrium. Thus, there exists i ∈H and x∈Z
Since X*∈F(w), w* = x + ≤ X*
leading to a contradiction. Thus it is not the case that x ≤ X* i + e. In fact we have shown that for i ∈H and x∈Z L , with x ≤ X* i + e, it is the case that
Since X *i << X* i + e, for t ∈(0,1), t sufficiently small, the real vector X* i + t(x -X* i ) << X* i + e.
leading to a contradiction. This establishes the theorem. Q.E.D.
In the above proof, we used the well-behavedness of the production functions to conclude that local profit maximization implies global profit maximization. The following example (which emerged from a very illuminating correspondence with Katta Murty) shows that not all functions on Z L which are restrictions of concave functions on are wellbehaved. It also shows that Theorem 1 may not hold without the well-behavedness assumption and "local profit maximization" need not imply "global profit maximization" in the absence of this crucial assumption. Hence, there does not exist α, β∈ and γ∈ : α
By Farka's Theorem there exists t∈ such that
Dividing the three inequalities above by ∑ , we get there exists s∈ such that = w, =1 and > f(w), contradicting that f is partially concave at w.
Hence there exists α, β∈ and γ∈ : α
By Farka's Theorem there does not exist t∈ such that ∑ = 0 and 0 . Without the Weak Monotonicity of V at w, we are not able to ensure that the vector of prices is non-zero. We can only guarantee that the vector is non-negative, which is not enough for it to be a price vector.
5 Having made this observation one may be tempted to conclude that a constrained market equilibrium exists if for all y∈C(w), V(y) is the optimal value of the following linear programming maximization problem: Maximize
α(x) ≥ 0 for all x∈C(w). That such a conclusion would be incorrect is once again illustrated by the illustrative example in section 5. That example does not admit a constrained market equilibrium, although it satisfies the requirements spelt out in the latter group of linear programming problems. It is precisely this problem with the existence of market equilibrium, constrained or otherwise, that has lead to alternative solution concepts, primarily for the class of bundle auction problems. One of them is due to Wurman and Wellman (1999) , which can be easily extended to the class of all integer allocation problems. Towards that end let us define a payment function to be a function π:Z L →ℜ + , where for x∈Z L , π(x) is the payment that is required to be made to purchase the bundle x. A payment equilibrium is an ordered pair <π*,X*>, where π* is a payment function and X* is a feasible integer allocation that together satisfy the following condition: However, the construction of the payment function for an integer allocation problem, generally requires an infinite number of computations and hence an unrealistic data set. Thus, its practical usefulness as a solution for integer allocation problems is quite limited. several months. I would like to thank him immensely for his considered comments on the problem and the paper and to Aswin Palanivell for having noted an error in the same example. I have also benefited immensely by discussing excerpts from this paper with Nilanjan Banik, Sayantan Ghosal, L. Ramprasath, and Peter Wurman, for which I would like to thank them very warmly.
